Deficits in Unity and Management: Why Resource Wealth Does Not Produce Strategic Strength and Power in Muslim Majority Societies

# Deficits in Unity and Management: Why Resource Wealth Does Not Produce Strategic Strength and Power in Muslim Majority Societies

Muhammad Haniff Hassan,¹ Fellow, RSIS-NTU

This article is an expanded version of the author's Malay article, Apabila Tidak Bersatu dan Gagal Mengurus (When Unity and Management Fail), first posted on 19 July 2007 on his personal website his personal website.

Synopsis

This article argues that many Muslim-majority societies fail to convert abundant resources and talent into strategic strength because of deficits in unity and management, rather than external constraints alone. The article shows that owning resources is not the same as possessing capability and draws lessons for the Singapore Muslim community.

Introduction

Why do many Muslim-majority societies remain unable to translate substantial natural resources, human capital and intellectual potential into sustained development and strategic strength?

Existing scholarship and public discourse have identified a range of factors that help explain the challenges of development in Muslim-majority societies, including the legacies of colonialism, geopolitical pressures, economic inequality, technological gaps and the influence of more powerful states. These factors remain important for understanding the historical and contemporary conditions of Muslim-majority societies. The argument here is not intended to displace them, but to draw attention to another dimension that may deepen our understanding of why substantial resources and considerable human potential do not always translate into sustained institutional and developmental outcomes, and ultimately into strength and power.

This additional perspective concerns the way resources are organised, coordinated and managed. Resources create potential, but potential becomes capability only when it is effectively mobilised and institutionalised. Talent, for example, does not by itself produce excellent institutions; wealth does not automatically generate technological capability; and possession of sophisticated equipment does not necessarily confer the capacity to maintain, develop or reproduce it.

From this perspective, two interrelated issues deserve particular attention: the ability to unite and coordinate available resources around common purposes, and the ability to manage those resources effectively. The argument can be understood as a progression from resources to capabilities, capabilities to institutions, and institutions to strategic autonomy. Examining these dimensions alongside more established explanations may offer further insight into the persistent gap between the resources Muslim-majority societies possess and what they are able to achieve collectively.

Abundant Resources, Limited Outcomes

Many Muslim-majority countries possess significant natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals, agricultural land and strategic geographical locations. Several also have large and increasingly educated populations.

Individuals of Muslim background have achieved at the highest levels of science, engineering and technology. Abdus Salam, the Pakistani theoretical physicist, shared the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physics for his contribution to electroweak theory.¹ Ahmed H. Zewail, the Egyptian-American chemist, won the 1999 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for pioneering femtochemistry.² B. J. Habibie, the Indonesian aeronautics engineer, was internationally recognised for his contributions to aircraft technology and played a major role in developing Indonesia's science, technology and aerospace capabilities.³ Uğur Şahin and Özlem Türeci, the Turkish-German scientists and entrepreneurs who co-founded BioNTech, played a central role in developing the Pfizer–BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine.⁴

Such achievements demonstrate that Muslim-majority societies are capable of producing individuals of exceptional ability. The greater challenge is translating individual excellence into sustained collective progress. A society may produce brilliant scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs and scholars while struggling to retain talent, coordinate expertise and turn knowledge into innovation. Development cannot depend on exceptional individuals alone. It requires strong universities, innovative companies, capable governments, supportive financial systems and effective mechanisms for preserving and transmitting knowledge across generations. The question is not whether Muslim-majority societies have talent and resources, but whether they can turn them into lasting capabilities.

Resources Owned, Capabilities Imported

The gap between possessing resources and possessing the capability to develop and sustain them can be seen across several sectors, including natural resources, infrastructure, human capital and, most significantly, defence. The issue is not the use of foreign expertise itself. International cooperation is normal in a globalised economy, and foreign expertise can make an important contribution to development. The more important question is whether external expertise is used to build domestic capability or whether it remains a permanent substitute for it.

The natural resources sector provides several illustrations of the gap between possessing valuable resources and having the capability to develop and exploit them. Guinea⁵, which possesses some of the world's largest bauxite reserves, has become a leading global producer, yet much of its industrial-scale production is undertaken by private or mixed-ownership companies involving foreign investors.⁶ Despite possessing the world's fifth-largest proven crude-oil reserves, Iraq continues to rely substantially on international oil companies for investment, field development and technical expertise.⁷ A similar pattern can be seen in Indonesia's Grasberg mine, one of the world's major sources of copper and gold. Freeport began commercial mining in Papua in 1973, but it was only in 2018, 45 years later, that the Indonesian government acquired a 51.23 per cent majority stake in PT Freeport Indonesia. Even after the transfer, Freeport-McMoRan remained closely involved in the mine's operation and development.⁸ These cases illustrate that possessing abundant natural resources does not automatically provide a country with the technological, managerial and operational capabilities needed to exploit them independently.

The same pattern can be observed in major infrastructure projects. In Tajikistan, the 670 MW Sangtuda-1 Hydroelectric Power Plant was completed through a Russian-Tajik joint venture in which Russian entities hold 75 per cent and the Tajik government 25 per cent. The plant, commissioned in 2009, remains under predominantly Russian ownership and management, illustrating long-term foreign involvement in a strategically important component of Tajikistan's electricity infrastructure.⁹ In Indonesia, the Paiton power complex provides another example. Paiton 7 and 8 began operating in 1999, yet Paiton Energy remained substantially foreign-owned and operated for more than two decades, with Japan's Mitsui & Co. holding a 45.515 per cent stake until its divestment in 2024. The electricity generated was sold to Indonesia's state-owned electricity company, PLN, under a long-term power-purchase agreement.¹⁰ These cases illustrate how countries may develop major infrastructure while continuing to rely on foreign entities for significant aspects of their ownership, management and operation over extended periods.

The issue is equally relevant to human capital. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar rely heavily on expatriate workers and professionals in sectors ranging from construction and healthcare to education, finance, engineering and information technology.¹¹ Foreign professionals undoubtedly contribute valuable knowledge and skills, and their presence can support rapid economic development. Nevertheless, heavy reliance on expatriate expertise raises a longer-term question: to what extent are domestic institutions producing, retaining and renewing the strategic capabilities required by the country itself and whether it complements the development of domestic capabilities or substitutes for them? A society may therefore possess considerable financial resources and attract large numbers of highly skilled professionals without necessarily developing an equally strong indigenous human-capital base.

The dependence becomes particularly significant in military capability. According to SIPRI, the Middle East accounted for 27 per cent of global major arms imports in 2020–24, with Qatar and Saudi Arabia among the world's largest importers. The United States supplied 48 per cent of Qatar's and 74 per cent of Saudi Arabia's imports, while China supplied 81 per cent of Pakistan's.¹² These figures show purchasing power, not capability. Buying advanced weapons does not confer the ability to produce, maintain and upgrade them, and dependence on a few suppliers limits strategic autonomy.

The consequences become clearer when military capability is tested. When Juhayman al-`Utaybi and his followers seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, Saudi forces relied on French GIGN specialists in preparing and executing the final assault.¹³ At a larger scale, the 2026 US-Israel conflict with Iran exposed the limits of external security guarantees, as Iranian attacks reached Gulf states and strategic infrastructure despite extensive US military presence and advanced air-defence systems.¹⁴ Collectively, Arab states have yet to translate their substantial resources into a military capability comparable to Israel's, which retains a dominant regional position more than seven decades after its establishment.¹⁵ External protection may reduce vulnerability but cannot replace strategic autonomy. Without domestic defence capabilities, military expenditure may not translate into strategic autonomy.

Admittedly, examples of the opposite trajectory exist across sectors. The argument is not that Muslim-majority societies should avoid foreign expertise or international partnerships, which can be important instruments of development. The critical distinction is between using foreign expertise to build domestic capabilities and relying on it because those capabilities remain underdeveloped. The former can advance strategic autonomy; the latter can create structural dependence. Progress should therefore be measured not simply by what a society owns, but by what it can do, sustain and develop with those resources. Ownership creates assets. Capability, however, converts them into productive and strategic value, while institutions and knowledge transfer make that capability sustainable.

Deficits in Unity

One major obstacle to mobilisation is the difficulty of converting shared identity and common interests into effective collective action. Here, unity does not mean political unification or institutional uniformity. It means the capacity of different actors to coordinate their resources, knowledge and capabilities for agreed common purposes. Universities, governments, businesses, civil-society organisations and professional communities need not become identical, but they do need mechanisms for coordinating knowledge, resources and expertise.

The experience of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) illustrates this challenge. Although the OIC provides an institutional framework for cooperation among Muslim-majority states, studies have identified weaknesses in its institutional design, enforcement mechanisms and implementation capacity as constraints on its effectiveness.¹⁶ Empirical research on intra-OIC trade similarly finds that economic exchange among member states remains below its potential, while governance quality and institutional arrangements significantly affect the effectiveness of efforts to deepen integration.¹⁷ The experience of the Arab League points to a similar problem: shared cultural and historical identity has not been sufficient to overcome divergent national interests and state preferences.¹⁸ This is therefore not merely an economic problem but an institutional one. The challenge also exists at multiple levels: between states, between institutions within states, and among civil-society and professional organisations.

Shared identity can provide a basis for solidarity, but solidarity becomes collective capacity only when it is translated into mechanisms for coordination, information-sharing, division of labour, implementation and dispute resolution. The Qur'anic call to cooperate in righteousness and piety¹⁹ can, among other interpretations, be understood as providing a normative basis for such collective mobilisation. Its warnings against division, in the call to hold fast together and not to be divided²⁰ and in the caution that dispute leads to the loss of strength,²¹ point to the cost of failing to cooperate. In contemporary institutional terms, this requires more than emotional solidarity. It requires organisational capacity.

Deficits in Management

Even when resources are available and successfully mobilised, poor management can prevent them from producing sustained outcomes. This is not merely a technical or commercial issue. Research on OIC countries consistently points to the importance of institutional quality and governance in determining whether human, financial and natural resources translate into economic and developmental outcomes. Studies of OIC countries have found positive relationships between institutional quality, governance and economic performance, suggesting that resources and human capital require effective institutions to be converted into sustained development.²²

Management can also be understood through Islamic concepts such as amanah (trust and stewardship), itqan (excellence), shura (consultation) and `adl (justice), together with the contemporary principle of accountability. Research on leadership in Jordan, for example, has examined shura, amanah and itqan as Islamic principles associated with leadership behaviour in an Arab organisational context.²³ The challenge is therefore not to choose between Islamic values and professional management, but to translate ethical principles into institutional practices. Amanah requires responsible stewardship of public and organisational resources. Itqan requires standards of competence and quality, rather than good intentions alone. Shura requires meaningful consultation rather than symbolic participation. Justice requires fair procedures and merit-based decisions, while accountability requires transparency, monitoring and consequences for failure.

Good intentions cannot compensate for weak systems. An organisation may have dedicated people but lack clear objectives or strategic direction. It may possess substantial funding but allocate resources without reference to institutional priorities. It may employ talented individuals without effective mechanisms for evaluating performance, learning from failure or developing successors. Such organisations may remain active without becoming effective. The broader evidence from OIC countries reinforces this point: institutional quality and governance are not peripheral considerations but important determinants of whether resources and human capital generate sustained outcomes.²⁴

Institutional excellence therefore requires more than motivated individuals. It requires clear objectives, competent leadership, appropriate structures, reliable information, financial discipline, professional recruitment, performance evaluation, succession planning and continuous learning. Leadership must also build institutions that can outlast individual leaders. An organisation that depends excessively on one charismatic or exceptionally capable individual may perform well temporarily but remain institutionally fragile. Sustainable excellence requires systems that preserve knowledge, develop new leaders and maintain performance beyond the tenure of any one person.

From Resource Ownership to Resource Mobilisation

The central challenge is not simply to acquire more resources, but to mobilise existing ones effectively. This can be understood through four related levels:

Evidence from OIC countries supports this distinction. Studies show substantial differences in technological capabilities, including technology creation, diffusion and human skills, despite shared access to significant resources.²⁵ Research covering 39 OIC countries also finds that political and economic institutional quality significantly affects economic growth.²⁶ Studies of Gulf countries further suggest that natural-resource dependence can constrain human-capital development.²⁷ Resources, therefore, become developmental assets only when supported by human capital, technology and effective institutions. This helps explain why wealth alone does not guarantee development. Resource-rich countries can remain dependent when they fail to build technological capabilities and strong institutions, while resource-poor countries can compensate through human capital, institutional quality, strategic planning and international economic integration. Singapore illustrates the latter trajectory, having made human-capital development central to its economic strategy while using foreign investment and expertise to promote technology transfer and local industrial upgrading.²⁸ Norway illustrates how substantial natural-resource wealth can be combined with strong institutions and long-term governance to support sustained development.²⁹

The lesson for Muslim-majority societies is not to reject foreign expertise or international cooperation, but to use them strategically. Partnerships should produce more than a completed project. They should contribute to knowledge transfer, local training, research capacity, domestic supply chains and institutional learning.

Conclusion: Lessons for the Singapore Muslim Community

The preceding analysis suggests that the challenge facing Muslim-majority societies is both the availability of resources and the ability to unite, organise and manage them effectively. Differences in political interests, schools of thought and institutional priorities need not prevent collective action. Management research shows that team performance suffers when differences harden into relationship, process or status conflict. Organisational performance likewise depends on how resources are organised and converted into capabilities. Clear objectives, effective leadership, coordination and performance management turn human and financial resources into sustained outcomes.³⁰

Unity does not mean uniformity. It means the capacity to sustain common purposes and cooperation despite differences. Yet unity alone is not enough. Where institutions lack effective systems for planning and coordination, talent and funding may yield limited results. Resources create potential, but unity directs that potential for common purposes, while good management converts it into lasting capability. These principles apply directly to the Singapore Muslim community.

As in many community sectors, the impact of Singapore's mosques, madrasahs, charities, Islamic organisations and professional associations can be limited when organisations work in isolation, duplicate efforts or depend excessively on a few individuals. The question should shift from, "How much do we have?" to, "What can we do collectively with what we have?" and then to, "What institutions must we build so that this capability outlasts the current generation?". This requires a culture that values competence alongside sincerity, systems alongside personalities, and institutional continuity alongside individual achievement.

The community does not lack resources or talented people. What it needs is the capacity to connect resources, coordinate talent and build institutions that sustain capability. The task is therefore not merely to acquire more wealth, produce more graduates or establish more organisations, but to develop the institutional intelligence to turn what it already possesses into lasting progress and strategic strength.

Author’s Declaration

The author acknowledges the limited use of ChatGPT and Google AI in the preparation of this article. Google AI was used to identify potentially relevant materials for further review, while ChatGPT assisted in refining the language and clarity of the manuscript, as well as checking for typographical and grammatical errors. The conceptual arguments, analytical framework and substantive ideas presented in this article are entirely the author's own. All references cited were independently verified by the author, and their authenticity and accuracy were confirmed prior to inclusion in the manuscript.

Notes

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15.International Institute for Strategic Studies (2025), The Military Balance 2025: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics, London: Routledge, 366-8; Daniel Flesch (2026), "Middle East", Index of Military Strength, available at https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-the-global-operating-environment/middle-east (accessed on October 8, 2026). ↩

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18.Michael Barnett and Etel Solingen (2009), "Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The Origins and Legacy of the Arab League," Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective, edited by Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 180-220. ↩

19.The Qur'an, 5:2. ↩

20.Ibid., 3:103. ↩

21.Ibid., 8:46. ↩

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26.Slesman, Baharumshah, and Ra’ees (2015), "Institutional Infrastructure". ↩

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